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Abstract 
It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellectual tasks. We 
report that in a company takeover experiment, groups placed better bids than individuals and 
substantially reduced the winner’s curse. This improvement was mostly due to peer pressure over 
the minority opinion and to learning. Learning took place from interacting and negotiating 
consensus with others, not simply from observing their bids. When there was disagreement, what 
prevailed was not the best proposal but the one of the majority. Groups underperformed with 
respect to a “truth wins” benchmark although they outperformed individuals deciding in 
isolation.  
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When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? 
A Company Takeover Experiment 
1. Introduction 
Many important economic, legal, political, and military decisions are made by groups. 
Can groups make better decisions than individuals in isolation? Existing empirical results are 
mixed. For instance, Cooper and Kagel (2005) report that small groups in strategic tasks deliver 
outcomes beyond the most optimistic expectations i.e., better than those from the most skilled 
individual in the group. In contrast, other studies report no difference or even worse performance 
of groups relative to individuals (Davis, 1992; Kerr et al., 1996; Sutter et al., 2009). The aim of 
this study is to provide evidence of group superiority (or inferiority) to individuals in a well-
known negotiation task, to shed light on the possible explanations of the differences between 
individual and group decisions, and to deliver implications about when to employ groups rather 
than individuals in decision making. To fulfill this aim, we compare individual and group 
performances in a company takeover experiment (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985). Field 
evidence about overbidding has been accumulated for a variety of similar economic situations, 
from mineral right auctions, eBay auctions, to baseball’s free agency market, to IPOs pricing and 
to corporate takeovers (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003). However, through laboratory 
experiments one can cleanly control the cost and information structure of the interaction in ways 
unfeasible in the field. 
In a company takeover a potential buyer wants to acquire a company because it will be 
worth more under his or her management than under the potential seller’s management. We 
consider a task where the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller who can either accept 
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or reject. The interaction is non-trivial because the seller has more accurate information than the 
buyer about the value of the company. In experiments, individuals hardly place optimal bids and 
many individuals actually acquire the company but incur losses; moreover they fail to correct 
their choices over time. This behavioral phenomenon is known as winner’s curse and should not 
occur if agents are rational. Yet it is remarkably robust both in laboratory and field situations 
(Kagel and Levin, 2002). We want to understand if groups overcome the winner’s curse by 
studying a negotiation context such as the company takeover game because it is much simpler 
than a multi-person auction and hence may provide a cleaner view of bidders’ decision making 
processes (Charness and Levin, 2009). While optimal bidding in auctions depends on involved 
calculations, belief about other’s rationality, and on strategic uncertainty, such considerations are 
absent in this task.1  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experiment investigating 
groups’ behavior in a company takeover game. 
The experiment presents four important features. First, we isolate the group impact in 
performing the task from the group impact in shifting risk attitude. Second,, we perform a micro-
level analysis of the group processes for reaching a consensual choice. Before the group 
discussed possible bids, each participant was required to post a bid proposal for the team to 
consider. This piece of information allows us to identify the precise aggregation rule that is used 
to determine a group’s bid within each group and see if what emerged was the best proposal 
(truth-wins norm, Lorge and Solomon, 1955), the median proposal, the proposal of the majority, 
the worst proposal, a rotation scheme, or other rules.  Third, we set strong incentives for subjects 
                                                 
1 “the origin of this phenomenon [winner’s curse] must stem from some form of bounded rationality, such as the 
decision maker’s failure to recognize that a “future” event, per se, is informative and relevant for their current 
decisions, compounded by poor updating when this idea is even considered.” Charness and Levin (2009). 
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to communicate and negotiate within the group because every group member had veto power on 
the final bid. If there was disagreement on the group choice, everyone in the group earned zero.2  
Fourth, we study two different aspects that might help learning, group communication and 
negotiation or the simple exposure to choices of others. 
  We report that groups substantially reduced the winner's curse and generally placed 
better bids than individuals deciding in isolation. Groups did however underperform with respect 
to a “truth wins” benchmark, although they outperformed individuals deciding in isolation. This 
result was attributed to both the effect of group learning and the aggregation rule within the 
group. When there was disagreement within a group, what prevailed was not the best but the 
opinion of the majority. This result is not an unconditional endorsement of the superiority of 
groups over individuals, but leads to implications about when to employ groups and when to 
employ individuals in decision making. For instance, groups could do worse than individuals in 
difficult tasks. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on the 
winner’s curse and group decision-making. Section 3 describes theoretical predictions, 
experimental design and procedures for the present study, and Section 4 reports the main results 
of our study. Section 5 examines alternative explanations for the superiority of groups over 
individuals, while Section 6 analyzes the content of group communication during the company 
                                                 
2 Existing studies of group decision making greatly differ on this point, which crucially affects the incentives for 
communicating with others and for convincing others of one's opinion (Zhang and Casari, 2011). Cooper and Kagel 
(2005) randomly select one member’s proposal as the group choice. Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Gillet et al. 
(2009) either implement a majority rule or give members no time limit to reach a unanimous decision. Kocher and 
Sutter (2007) is the most closely related paper with a veto power feature. In a gift-exchange game, Kocher and 
Sutter allowed groups of three up to 10 rounds to reach agreement. If there was no agreement in the 10th round, each 
group member received only a show-up fee of $20. Only one group failed to reach an agreement. They didn’t 
analyze the effect of such veto power though. Kagel et al. (2010) studied the veto power in a committee where only 
one of the three committee members is a veto player. 
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takeover task. Section 7 concludes with practical implications of the study findings. 
 
2. Literature Review  
Two experimental studies employed groups as bidders in auctions. Cox and Hayne 
(2006) compare the performance of individuals and groups of five members in a sealed-bid 
common value auction. Groups performed better when the information was common to all group 
members rather than when there was a need of information sharing within the group. In the 
former case, individuals deciding within groups earned more than when deciding in isolation. In 
the latter case, earnings were roughly equivalent. Our design resembles the treatment with 
common information among all group members; hence it relieves groups from the additional 
burden of information sharing. Sutter et al. (2009) compare the performance of individuals and 
groups of three members in an English auction with a private and a common value component. 
They report that groups submitted more winner’s curse bids and therefore earned lower profits 
than individual bidders. They attribute this findings to individual-group differences toward 
competition, i.e., groups competing with other groups are more aggressive than individuals 
competing with other individuals, which is absent in our design as there is just one buyer and the 
seller is a robot. Moreover, bidders can more easily explain to others the rationale for an optimal 
bid in our company takeover task than in a common value auction. One reason is that the optimal 
strategy does not depend on the bids of others.3 In Section 7 we will come back to the above 
studies and interpret the results in light of our findings. 
                                                 
3 A typical quote on reasoning of the optimal bid in the company takeover game is: “let’s not go with 90 because the 
only way we can make money is if its [the company value] 90. [the company value] might as well go with 60, it 
came out less times, and if 38 comes out we don’t lose as much and 60 makes the most economic sense.” 
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This study is also related to other company takeover experiments. We reviewed eight 
available experimental studies that have utilized the company takeover game in the economics 
and management literature.4 In all of these studies, decision makers were individuals. In none of 
them, does the winner’s curse disappear with a reasonable amount of experience and feedback. 
Indeed, individuals in these studies failed to avoid the winner's curse even when they were paid 
for good performance, when their intellectual reputations were at stake, when they were given 
hints, and when unusually analytical participants were used. 
In the current experiment, we followed the state-of-the art design features for company 
takeover studies. First, some studies place the equilibrium bid at the corner of the choice space, 
either at 0% or 100%, or in the middle at 50%. We changed this to avoid classifying noisy 
players as mostly out of equilibrium or mostly at equilibrium (Holt and Sherman, 1994, Selten et 
al., 2005). Second, most of the studies on the company takeover game found a very high share of 
sub-optimal bids, suggesting that the task is well beyond the ability of participants to solve it. 
Following Charness and Levin (2009), in our experiment the task was simplified by adopting a 
discrete and small set of company values for the seller. Third, existing studies have varied in 
repeating the task from 1 to 100 but generally have found that a very slow improvement in 
performance with repetition. We had participants repeat the task 26 times, which still allowed us 
to detect learning. Fourth, all studies used robot sellers, so do we, with the exception of Carroll et 
al. (1990, treatments 5 and 6 only).  
 Our company takeover game is closer to an intellectual task rather than a judgemental 
                                                 
4 Ball, Bazerman, Carroll (1991), Charness and Levin (2009), Holt and Sherman (1994), Selton, Abbink, and Cox 
(2005), Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf (2008), Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer, Bazerman (2007), Carroll, Delquie, 
Halpern, Bazerman (1990), Tor and Bazerman (2003). See detailed design comparison in Table A1. 
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task because it is straightforward to explain to others once a subject understands what the 
optimal bid is.5 In comparing individual and group performance in intellective task, Lorge and 
Solomon (1955) proposed to replace absolute performance of the group with the “truth wins” 
benchmark (i.e., the group should be able to achieve a correct answer if at least one member 
would have chosen it in isolation). Thus, if a fraction p of individuals working alone reaches the 
correct solution, the probability that in a randomly selected group of n persons at least one knows 
it is 1 – (1-p) n. The truth wins benchmark sets a higher standard for the group superiority than 
absolute performance. While the management literature on intellective tasks suggests that the 
absolute performance of groups is superior to the performance of individuals (Laughlin et al., 
2003), research on group performance in the psychology literature documents that freely 
interacting groups very rarely exceed and usually fall below the truth wins standard (Davis, 
1992, Kerr et al., 1996).  
Results from experimental economics on group performance in intellective tasks are 
more mixed. In a beauty-contest game, Kocher and Sutter (2005) found that groups of three 
subjects did not do more iterations of reasoning than individuals, but learned faster than 
individuals via face to face communication. In signalling games, Cooper and Kagel (2005, 2009) 
reported that teams of two play more strategically than individuals after exchanging messages in 
online chat rooms and a change in the meaningful context of the game stalled individual learning 
process but had no effect on the strategic play of teams. They conclude that teams outperformed 
                                                 
5 The psychological literature on group versus individual decision-making distinguishes between judgmental and 
intellective tasks. A judgemental task involves problems where there is no obvious “correct” action and individuals 
may legitimately differ on their choices because of their values or preferences. In contrast, an intellective task has a 
demonstrably “correct” solution. While this solution may be difficult to discover, it is self-explanatory once 
discovered and can easily be demonstrated to others 
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the truth win benchmark using a simulation of team play based on randomly drawing two 
individuals from the individual treatment. Instead of relying on simulated data, our within-
subject design allows us to count the instances in which the optimal proposal from the individual 
member prevailed to a final group choice. Also, we examined team play in groups of three rather 
than two, which permits interesting majority or minority behaviour. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
There were three treatments following distinct decision making processes: individual 
decision making (Individual treatment), group decision making (Group treatment) and a 
treatment with individual decision making where a subject observed the bids of two other people 
(Signal treatment). Every session had 15 subjects facing a series of lotteries (parts 1 and 2) and 
then a series of company takeover games (parts 3 and 4). 
The lottery tasks measured participants’ risk attitude through a series of binary choices 
between a “safe” and a “risky” option. The elicitation of risk attitudes with both individual and 
group decision making may help in the interpretation of choices in the company takeover game. 
For instance, if there is a shift of risk attitude toward more risk averse choices in group decision 
making, groups may perform better than individuals subject to overbidding. The incentive 
structure was similar to that in Holt and Laury (2002). Participants chose between a deterministic 
earning (50 tokens) and a lottery with either a 150 earning or 0. A first measurement was carried 
out at the individual level using a multiple price list design with fifteen decisions (part 1) and 
then the same choices were repeated in a randomly formed group of three members (part 2). 
Group members had to submit unanimous choices after chatting. Only one decision from part 1 
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and one from part 2 were randomly selected for payment at the end of the session. More details 
are available in Zhang and Casari (2010).  
The company takeover task included six initial periods of individual decision making 
(part 3), identical in all treatments, and twenty periods with different decision making processes 
across treatments (part 4). In the company takeover game there are a buyer and a seller who 
move sequentially (Samuelson, 1984, Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985). The buyer makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer b∈{0, 1, 2,…, 360} to a seller whose company’s value is s. The seller either 
rejects or accepts the bid. The payoffs for the seller are s if he or she rejects and b if he or she 
accepts. The payoffs for the buyer are 0 if the seller rejects and (1.5s – b) if he or she accepts. 
The company can have five possible values, s∈{38, 60, 90, 130, 240}. When making a decision, 
the seller has private information about s, while the buyer knows that each realization of s has 
equal probability. In the experiment, all subjects faced the company takeover game as potential 
buyers. Sellers were simulated by a computer that accepted bids only when the bid b was greater 
than or equal to s. This simplified game reduced the complexity of the strategic interactions 
between sellers and buyers and the possible misunderstanding of the game.  
To sum up, the task was a bilateral bargaining problem with asymmetric information and 
valuations. The informational disadvantage of the buyer was offset by an assumption that the 
buyer's value is 1.5 times the seller value, s. A rational buyer has the following objective 
function (1), where I {b≥x} equals 1 when the bid b ≥ x and 0 otherwise: 
(1) Rational objective:   
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(2) Naïve objective:   
 
A bid of 60 is the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) strategy for the buyer and yields an 
expected profit of 5.4. Table 1 shows buyer’s profits for the RNNE strategy and other bidding 
strategies. Instead, an incorrect reasoning may lead some participants to bid 90 and earn an 
expected profit of 2.4, which is sub-optimal. We computed this prediction following the Holt and 
Sherman (1994) model of naïve bidding (2) in order to select a design for the experiment with a 
rational bid lower than the naïve bid. A naïve bidder does not condition the value of the company 
on the level of the accepted bid, rather, assumes that the value is always the expected value of s, 
which is 111.6. As illustrated by the objective (2), a naïve bidder erroneously thinks a bid of 90 
would yield an expected profit of 0.6⋅(1.5⋅111.6 – 90)=46.44. Instead, when placing a bid of 90, 
the company is sold only for values s 38, 60, 90 but not for 130 and 240. As illustrated by (1), 
the expected value conditional on being accepted is not 111.6, but (38+60+90)/3 = 62.66.  Thus, 
the expected profit is 2.4 (Table 1). When the buyer does not take into account that acceptance is 
itself an informative event, the buyer may overbid and even incur an expected loss.  
In selecting the parameters, we avoided the extremes values (i.e., 38 or 240) for the 
RNNE bid and the naïve bid (90) and set the equilibrium probability of acquiring the company at 
40% in order to ensure that the participants stayed engaged in the task. There were five possible 
company values to position the task at an intermediate level of difficulty for our subject pool; 
two pilot experiments suggested that with three values the task was too easy and with one 
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hundred values it was too difficult.6  
To favor learning, each participant observed the company value at the end of each period 
– even when the company was not acquired. There was a practice period with forced input. In all 
treatments, the initial six periods involved individual decision making and every period the 
computer randomly drew 15 company values, one for each participant (part 3). 
The rules in the following twenty periods differed by treatment (part 4). In the Individual 
treatment, the company takeover task continued to be individual decision making except that 
while submitting a bid, subjects also stated their confidence level in the bid (low, medium, high) 
without monetary incentives and could add a brief text with reasons for the choice of that bid, 
which only the experimenter could observe.  
In the Group treatment, participants faced the company takeover game in fixed groups of 
three members, which were randomly formed at the beginning of the session.7 Every period 
included a proposal phase, a chat phase, and a bidding phase. In the proposal phase, subjects 
submitted an individual bid proposal (an integer between 0 and 360), a confidence level in their 
proposal (low, medium, or high) without monetary incentives, and could also send a brief text 
explaining the proposed bid. This information was placed on a public board for all three group 
members to see. Participants then could switch to a chat window and had two minutes to send 
                                                 
6 Another consideration was to have a naïve bid higher than the RNNE bid. After fixing the lower four company 
values one needs to add a very high maximum company value; we decided that the maximum bid would be 240, in 
order to put a large enough profit distance between the RNNE and naïve bid. According to expression (2), with a 
fifth company value a 240 value, the “profit distance” between a 60 and 90 bids is 7.5%. Instead, with an alternative 
value of 183 such bids yield equal profits. 
7 Hence, group composition was identical in the lottery task in part 2 and in the company takeover task in part 4. 
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free-form messages to others in their groups.8 Messages were recorded. In the bidding phase, 
subjects had up to three rounds to reach a consensus on their group bid without further possibility 
to chat. If there still was no unanimity, no group bid was submitted and group members earned 
zero profits for that period.  
The Signal treatment was identical to the Individual treatment except that before 
submitting their bids, each participant could observe the bids of two other people. More 
precisely, we used the data from previous sessions and displayed two bids each period that were 
independently placed by the same two participants under the Individual treatment. Member 1 in 
the signal treatment always observed the bids of members 2 and 3. Member 2 in the signal 
treatment always observed the bids of members 1 and 3. Member 3 in the signal treatment 
always observed the bids of members 1 and 2. 
To make the decisional process more comparable across treatments, all treatments 
followed the same random draw procedure in part 4. That is, every period the computer 
randomly drew five company values, one for each group of three persons.9 . In the Signal 
treatment we employed the same random draws realized in the Individual treatment sessions.10  
Participants started with a 200 token endowment in part 3 and a 300 token endowment 
and in part 4. In equilibrium, the individual period earnings were identical in all treatments. 
                                                 
8 In the chat window, participants received an id number 1-3 in the order they sent messages in that specific period. 
We asked participants to follow two basic rules: to be civil to one another and not use profanities, and not to identify 
themselves in any manner. 
9 In individual and signal treatments, even though there was no group decision making in part 4, the same company 
value was given to each members of the groups that were formed in part 2. 
10 Session dates were 27 Sep 07, 23 Oct 07 (Individual), 28 Oct 07(a), 28 Oct 07(b) (Signal), 25 Sep 07, 2 Oct 07, 4 
Oct 07, 11 Oct 07 (Group). For the signal session 28 Oct 07 (a) we used the random draws of individual session Sep 
27 and for signal session Oct 28b we used the random draws of individual session 23 Oct 07.. 
12 
 
Subjects were paid for all periods. 11 The experiment included eight sessions for a total of 120 
people; 60 people participated in the Group treatment, 30 in the Individual and 30 in the Signal 
treatments. Participants were randomly recruited from the undergraduate campus population of 
Purdue University and nobody participated in more than one session. Instructions were read 
aloud and subjects received a written copy. Sessions were run on a z-tree application 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted on average about 2 hours. A subject earned on average about $20, 
with a guaranteed minimum payment of $5. We paid $0.03 for each experimental token.  
 
4. Main Results 
Given that the majority of bids were not optimal, in addition to examining the fraction of 
optimal bids, we present multiple measures of performance. Winner’s curse bids are those that 
yield an expected loss, which are in the intervals (57, 60), (73.5, 90), or (94, 360). In expectation 
a subject is better off bidding 0, rather than placing a winner’s curse bid. Dispersed bids are bids 
different from 38, 60, 90, 130, or 240. Participants should recognize that any bid in between 0 
and 360 is weakly dominated by one of the bids above. We call these bids “dispersed,” but 
exclude from the definition 39, 61, 91, 131, and 241 in case participants did not understand the 
tie-breaking rule. A dispersed bid is not optimal for either a rational or naive bidder. 
Result 1: The group treatment outperformed the individual treatment in the fraction of winners’ 
curse bids, dispersed bids, and optimal bids. 
                                                 
11 Note that when cumulative earnings were low, there was a problem of limited liability, which we will discuss in 
the Result section. The instruction explained: “What if my earnings are negative?  They will be compensated with 
your other gains. More precisely, if you have a loss in a single period, it will decrease your cumulative earnings. If 
your cumulative earnings in this part are negative, they will decrease your earnings in other parts of the experiment. 
However, if at the end of the session your earnings are negative, you will receive $5.” 
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Table 2 provides support for Result 1. The group treatment exhibited less winners’ curse 
bids (10.5% vs. 18.3%) and less dispersed bids (2.5% vs. 4.8%) than the individual treatment.12 
In addition, optimal bids are more frequent in the group treatment than in the individual 
treatment, but the difference was not significant (48.5% vs. 37.5%).13  
In some cases overbidding may be rational because of limited liability issues. For 
instance a subject with a low cash balance can expect to earn more by bidding 240 instead of the 
equilibrium bid of 60.14 In the data, these occurrences involved a total of five participants and 
only 1.2% of all bids. Hence, removing those observations affected by limited liability issues 
does not affect the main results. However, to avoid confounding effects, we dropped these 
observations from all regression analyses. 
Result 2: In the group treatment, there was a significant improvement in performance over time 
in terms of the fraction of optimal bids, winner’s curse bids, and dispersed bids.  
Table 2 and Figures 1-3 provide support for Result 2. The fraction of optimal bids 
                                                 
12 An observation is the fraction of bids in the relevant category for each group in all 20 periods in part 4.The group 
treatment has also significantly more optimal bids (Mann-Whitney tests, n=30, m=20, p= 0.03; Robust Rank Order 
tests, one-tailed p=0.01) than the signal treatment. All p-values reflect two-tailed tests in this paper, unless otherwise 
stated. 
13 In the data analysis, both 60 and 61 are treated as optimal bids. We performed statistical tests on these differences. 
When treating each individual as an observation, the difference in fraction of winners’ curse bids is significant 
(Mann-Whitney tests on part 4: n=30, m=60, p=0.06). Similarly for dispersed bids (n=30, m=60, p= 0.007). The 
difference in terms of optimal bids is not significant (n=30, m=60, p= 0.17).  When treating each group as an 
observation, the difference in fraction of winners’ curse bids is marginally significant in some tests (Mann-Whitney 
test: n=30, m=20, p=0.14; Robust Rank Order tests: n=30, m=20, one-tailed asymptotic p=0.08) and for dispersed 
bids (n=30, m=20, Mann-Whitney tests p= 0.077; Robust Rank Order tests one-tailed p=0.125). Again, the 
difference in terms of optimal bids is not significant (Mann-Whitney tests n=30, m=20, p= 0.288; Robust Rank 
Order tests one-tailed p=0.15). 
14 Bidding 240 yields a 120 profit with probability 0.2 and a loss y with probability 0.8.The variable y is the 
minimum between the actual loss (i.e. 240 minus the value of the company) and the cash balance. If the cash balance 
is below y=23.25 the eventual loss is inconsequential. When y<23.25 the expected profit from a 240 bid are higher 
than 5.4 i.e. the expected profits from a 60 bid. Two caveats are in order. First, we guarantee a $5 minimum 
earnings, which translates into 166.6 tokens, hence the relevant threshold for cash balances is 189.9. Second, the 
reference cash balance includes the expected earnings from part 1 and 2 lotteries, the part 3 and 4 endowments and 
the cumulative profits from the company takeover game up to that period. 
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increased from an initial level of 30.6% to 50.5% in the group treatment. This difference between 
part 3 and part 4 was significant according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (N=60, p=0.0004). 
The fraction of winner’s curse bids declined from an initial level of 18.3% to 9.75%, while the 
fraction of dispersed bids declined from 11.1% to 0.2%. These differences between part 3 and 
part 4 were both significant according to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (N=60, p=0.032; and N=60, 
p=0.002, respectively).  
The process of making proposals in the group provides useful insights. The following 
findings come from a series of probit regressions to explain when an individual proposal was 
optimal or winner’s cursed in the group treatment (Table 3, columns e and f). Robust standard 
errors with clusters on groups are used to eliminate intragroup correlations that may arise due to 
interactions with group members. First, more risk averse subjects were significantly less likely to 
make winner’s curse proposals. This finding is in line with our conjecture that more risk averse 
participants would fall prey to winner’s curse less often. Notwithstanding, risk preferences 
cannot account for why the group treatment outperformed the individual treatment (Result 1), as 
we will discuss later. Second, participants with high confidence in their proposals were less 
likely to make winner’s curse proposals. Third, the fraction of optimal proposals significantly 
increased over time (negative coefficient on trend dummy 1/period), which is in contrast with the 
absence of improvement observed in the individual treatment. Fourth, there was no significant 
effect of major, skill, or gender on proposals.   
Result 3: In the individual treatment, there was no significant improvement in performance over 
time in terms of fraction of optimal bids, winner’s curse bids, and dispersed bids. 
Table 2 reports evidence for Result 3. Overall, a minority of bids were optimal. The 
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fraction of optimal bids were at an initial level of 35.6% and remained about constant at 37.5% 
in the individual treatment (Table 2, columns a and b). This difference between part 3 and part 4 
was not significant according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.15 The fraction of winner’s curse 
bids was at an initial level of 20.0% and remained about constant at 18.3%, while the fraction of 
dispersed bids declined from 9.4% to 4.8%. None of these differences between part 3 and part 4 
were significant according to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (N=30, p=0.50; and N=30, p=0.66, 
respectively). 
To study the determinants of individual bids, we carried out a series of probit regressions 
with robust errors on individuals separately on the initial bids (part 3) and on the bids placed 
later on (part 4). The analysis on the initial bids included observations from all sessions (Table 3 
columns a and b). None of these regressions detected significant improvement in performance 
over time. When was an individual bid optimal or winner’s cursed? To address this question, we 
included regressors on risk attitude, levels of confidence for the proposal, measures of skill, 
demographic characteristics, a trend dummy (1/period), plus past company values and session 
dummies.16 The results showed that science and engineering major placed optimal bids 
significantly more often than other majors. The results also showed that ability captured by 
SAT/ACT scores mattered in handling the company takeover game. Bottom quartile of the 
                                                 
15 N=30, p=0.32 when considering all periods of Part 4; N=30, p=0.32 when restricting to the last 6 period of Part 4. 
16 In terms of risk attitude, risk seeking participants are coded as one when they switched from option A to B at 
question seven or earlier, while participants who switched at question 13 or later are coded with risk averse dummy 
equals one. Hence, risk averse dummy identifies participants with a very high degree of risk aversion, rather than 
every risk-averse participant. One dummy regressor coded whether the subject had high confidence in the bid 
placed. Participants were asked to indicate the confidence level only in part 4 of all treatments. Skill proxies were 
the SAT/ACT scores obtained from the university Registrar’s Office. SAT/ACT scores were collected for 92.5% of 
the participants (missingdata=0), who are coded using the US nationwide distribution of the SAT-takers (College 
Board of Education, 2006). The threshold for low ability was set at the lower quartile. The cutoff values were the 
average between male and female national tables. Other demographic variables we included were gender, economics 
and business major and science and engineering major. 
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SAT/ACT takers was likely to place less optimal bids and more winner’s curse bids. No gender 
effect was observed. 
We also present probit regressions for later bids in the individual treatment (Table 3, 
columns c and d). The effects of demographics are different than in the initial bids, maybe 
because these analyses include only a subsample of subjects or because of experience. The 
results showed that science and engineering majors, as well as Economics & Business majors, 
placed optimal bids significantly more often than other majors. Men were more likely to place a 
winner’s curse bid. There was no significant effect of SAT/ACT scores. These results differ from 
the findings in Casari et al. (2007) in a common value auction setting. 
  
5. Explanations of the Main Results 
Why do groups outperform individuals? This section discusses three possible 
explanations related to (a) the aggregation of risk attitude in group decisions,  (b) observational 
learning, and (c) the aggregation of individual proposals into a final group bid. 
Depending on his or her risk attitude, a participant may bid differently in the company 
takeover task. The risk neutral Nash Equilibrium (RNNE) strategy for a buyer is to bid 60. Risk 
averse buyers may choose to bid 38 and risk seeking may bid 90. Bidding 130 or 240 yields 
negative expected payoff, and hence should never be chosen. The observed levels of risk attitude 
cannot explain the winner’s curse phenomenon in the Individual treatment. Less than six percent 
of the participants showed risk seeking behaviour, and hence 94% of bids should be either 38 or 
60 (see Table A3). Instead, they were 47.5% (Table 2, column b). This finding by itself is an 
important result for the winner’s curse literature in general: the origin of the winner’s curse when 
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participants decide in isolation does not lie in the risk attitude of participants. 
Even if taking into account risk attitude is not enough to deliver empirically accurate 
point predictions in the company takeover game, it is worthy to investigate whether the shift in 
risk preference may explain the improvement from the Individual to the Group treatment. It is an 
empirical question to test whether group decision-making in this specific setting yields a cautious 
shift or risky shift since the previous literature provides mixed results.17 Suppose individuals for 
some unspecified reason place above optimal bids in the company takeover game. If there is a 
systematic tendency of individuals interacting in groups to take less risks (i.e., to behave in a 
more risk averse way), than the same individuals deciding in isolation, groups will lower their 
bids in the company takeover game. In theory, this shift in risk attitude may be attributed to the 
improvement in the performance of groups that we reported in the company takeover game. As 
stated in Result 4 below, the data did not support this view.  
Result 4: The shift in risk attitude generated by group decision-making cannot explain the better 
performance of groups over individuals in the company takeover game. 
Each group made 15 lottery choices for a total of 1800 individual decisions (part 2). We 
measured agreement by comparing individual choices in lotteries (part 1) and group choices (part 
2). In 73.5% of the group decisions, there was unanimous agreement in the group. We focus now 
on those decisions where there was disagreement (465 group decisions). The data suggest that 
generally the median member dictated the group choice (76.8% of cases). However, there was a 
nontrivial amount of group decisions that were more risky than the decisions taken by the 
median member (16.8%). The opposite was less frequent (6.5%). Overall, we found that group 
                                                 
17 See Zhang and Casari (2011) for a detailed literature review.  
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choices over lotteries were closer to the behavior of a risk neutral agent than individual choices 
and did not detect a shift toward lower degrees of risk aversion in group decision making.18 
 We now discuss the impact of observational learning on group decisions: 
Result 5: When individuals could observe the bids placed by two other participants in the 
company takeover game, there was no significant improvement in performance in comparison 
with the individual treatment. 
Table 2 and Figures 1-3 provide support for Result 5. In the Signal treatment, each 
participant could observe the bids of two other people before submitting their bids. In 
comparison to the Individual treatment, we report no significant differences in terms of the 
fraction of optimal bids (29.7%), winner’s curse bids (18.3%), or dispersed bids (4.7%, Table 2, 
part 4, Mann-Whitney tests, n=30, m=30, p=0.26; p=0.67; p=0.40, respectively; Robust Rank 
Order tests, one-tailed p=0.13; p=0.34; p=0.29)). In comparison with the group treatment, the 
Signal treatment has a significantly lower frequency of optimal bids (Mann-Whitney tests, n=20, 
m=30, p= 0.03; Robust Rank Order tests, one-tailed p=0.01).19 
Table 3 presents probit regressions for the Signal treatment on who placed optimal or 
winner’s curse bids (col. g and h). Regressors control for the type of bids subjects observed. 
More specifically, whether at least one of the observed bids, or both, were optimal; whether at 
least one of the observed bids, or both, yielded an expected loss. According to the regression 
                                                 
18 The fraction of risk neutral and risk seeking groups was lower than the fraction of risk neutral and risk seeking 
individuals (2.5% vs. 5.8%). The bulk of the choices reflected risk averse behavior. A two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test did not show a significant difference though (p=0.88). 
19 Mann Whitney tests on the SAT/ ACT across treatments indicate no significant difference across treatments. Thus 
the superiority is not due to less capable subjects showing up in the signal treatment. However, in part 3 of the 
Signal treatment there were significantly less optimal bids than in the corresponding part of both the individual and 
group treatments (Mann-Whitney tests n=30, m=30, p=0.01; Robust Rank Order tests, one-tailed p=0.006  for 
comparison between signal and individual treatments; Mann-Whitney tests n=60, m=30, p=0.004; Robust Rank 
Order tests, one-tailed p=0.003  for comparison between signal and group treatments). 
19 
 
results, participants did not strongly react to the observed bids and when they did react, it was 
sometimes in an unexpected direction. The regression shows an improvement in optimal bids 
over time.20  
When comparing bids in the initial periods (part 3) with the later periods (part 4) for the 
Signal treatment, the differences in the fractions of optimal bids, winner's curse bids, or 
dispersed bids are not statistically significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests: N=30, p=0.06; N=30, 
p=0.09; N=30, p=0.37, respectively).  
We argue that the reason for the superiority of groups over individuals lies in the way 
individual opinions were aggregated into a group choice, as explained below.21  
Result 6: When there was disagreement among group members on what bid to place in taking 
over the company, the median proposal prevailed in 75% of the cases. The final group bids were 
better than the median proposal in 7% of the cases and worse than the median proposal in 17% 
of the cases. Groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark. 
A key feature of the Group treatment was the individual bid proposals posted before the 
group discussion; hence there is a complete record of ex-ante agreement or disagreement among 
group members. A disagreement situation is when at least one member’s initial bid proposal was 
different from the final group bid. In the experiment there was a lively disagreement within 
groups; especially in the initial periods. Overall, there was agreement about 46.2% of the times. 
At the group bid stage, all groups eventually reached a unanimous group decision.  
We focus exclusively on the situations of disagreement in order to understand how the 
                                                 
20 The estimated coefficients for High confidence proposal, bottom quartile SAT/ACT scores, Science and 
Engineering have sometimes a different sign than in the other treatments. 
21 Gillet et al. (2009) have a treatment with limited communication that is a step closer to our group treatment: three 
subjects have repeated opportunities to send numerical messages until they all agree on a unanimous choice.  
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group dynamic aggregated diverging opinions. Probit regressions study the subsample of groups 
in disagreement (Table 5, column a). The dependent variable was 1 when an individual proposal 
became a group choice, 0 otherwise. Regressors included risk attitude, confidence level, major, 
gender and skills, low cash balance, whether it was a median and majoritarian proposal, whether 
it was a median but not a majoritarian proposal, and whether it was the proposal in the group that 
yielded the highest expected payoff. Period dummies were also included but not reported in the 
table.  
In the first regression, we pooled data from periods 1 to 6 where participants learned how 
to play the game at a faster rate than the latter periods. The second regression is based on data 
from periods 7-20.22 The comparison between the regressions using the first 6 and the last 14 
periods allowed us to examine the change in the determinants of group outcome across time. The 
main result from specifications (a) is that the median proposal was the strongest determinant of 
group choice, especially when it was a majority proposal. Such strong impact remains over time. 
The best proposal had no significant effect on group choices, which suggests that the “truth 
wins” norm does not apply to this experiment. In the early periods, more risk seeking 
participants, who had bottom 25% SAT/ACT scores, were less likely to convert their proposals 
to group choices while male participants were more likely to influence the group choices. These 
significant effects disappeared after period 6 though.  High confidence and major did not seem to 
be important factors. In intellective tasks, such as the company takeover game, one smart subject 
who knows the optimal bidding strategy can explain it in the chat to the other two group 
                                                 
22 We report another set of regressions in Table A4 which breaks down the periods by 1-10 and 11-20. Our main 
results are robust. 
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members and hence prove to them the superiority of his or her proposal.23 In a well-working 
group, this may well happen but it did not in the experiment. Consider the following back-of-the-
envelope calculation. About 30.6% of part 3 bids were optimal. Absent any learning, the chances 
that at least one group member proposed the optimal strategy were 66.4%. Actual optimal bids in 
group decisions of part 4 were 50.5%, which is considerably less than a “truth wins” norm (Table 
2). This is consistent with Charness et al., (2010)’s finding that the group does not meet the truth-
wins norm in overcoming the conjunction fallacy.  
By design, every participant had veto power in group decisions. Recall each group had 
three rounds to reach a unanimous bid after the individual proposals were revealed and text 
messages were exchanged among them. If there was disagreement on the final bid, the group lost 
the opportunity to place a bid for the period and everyone in the group earned zero. The veto 
power could have been usefully employed by a subject every time others in the group wanted to 
place a winner’s curse bid. For risk neutral and risk averse participants, a sure gain of zero is 
preferred to an expected loss. Did participants employ such veto power? Not much. First, there 
was no case where groups did not reach a final bid by the third trial. Second, the aggregation of 
winner’s curse proposals did not differ from the aggregation of proposals in general (Table 4). 
When the proposal of one member was a winner’s curse bid and the other two were not, it 
prevailed in 25.0% of the cases. When the proposals of two members were winner’s curse bids 
and the other was not, it prevailed in 77.8% of the cases. These percentages are aligned with 
those stated in Result 6. In the hypothetical case that a subject with a non-winner’s curse 
                                                 
23 At the beginning of each period, subjects must make a proposal in the pre-discussion stage which worked as an 
open brick for their discussion and also saved their chat time which was up to 2 minutes. There were 15 periods 
involved. Thus the smart subject had 30 minutes in total to explain the strategy to the other two. 
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proposal always vetoed group decisions for a winner’s curse bid, in the group treatment in part 4, 
only 1.5% of bids would have been winner’s curse (and not 9.75%). In other words, a rational 
use of veto power could have substantially reduced the fraction of winner’s curse bids. 
Participants simply did not employ it as much as they could. Our conjecture is that this is due to 
pressure to conform in group decision making. 
One aspect that needs clarification is how group decisions strictly based on the median 
bid proposal could improve performance in the company takeover game. We ran simulations by 
taking the median bid among three randomly drawn individual bids among all the bids placed in 
a given treatment in each period. We consider averages of 6000 simulations for each period. 
When comparing the actual results from Table 2 to the simulation results, there are two main 
conclusions. First, simulation on the part 4 individual treatment data, show a reduction of about 
half of the frequency of winner’s curse bids, from 18.3% to 9.4% (See Table A2). This reduction 
is similar to the actual result for the part 4 group treatment (9.7%, Table 2). Hence, a median 
aggregation rule in group decision would explain the better performance of groups compared to 
individuals with respect to placing winner’s curse bids. Even if groups do not match the 
performance of the “truth wins norm”, they are still a valuable tool in handling the company 
takeover task. The role of the group is to reduce the frequency of very high or very low bids 
entering into the market. While encouraging, this result may not extend to all possible 
intellective tasks. In particular, it may work in this setting where less than one third of the bids in 
any given treatment are winner’s curse bids but may possibly fail with a more difficult company 
takeover task where a majority of bids are winner’s curse bids.  
The second conclusion is that group decision processes cannot be simply reduced to a 
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median-taking rule. This conclusion is based on the simulated and actual fraction of optimal bids. 
The actual fraction of optimal bids in the group treatment of 50.5% (Table 2) is slightly better 
than the simulated median bid in the individual treatment (44.4%). This comparison suggests that 
additional learning took place within groups, which did not take place for stand-alone 
individuals. At the same time, based on the simulated median bids on the group proposals one 
may have expected an even better group performance (60.1% vs. 50.5%). A similar conclusion 
derives from the fraction of winner’s curse bids (3.5% vs. 9.75%). While the median proposal 
has a strong drawing power in group decision making, there are other forces at work, which 
make decisions worse than the median proposal. 
 
6. Results: Content Analysis of Chat Messages 
Additional insight into the group dynamics taking place in the Group treatment comes 
from the analysis of messages exchanged within each group through a chat function. Units of 
messages were coded for select groups and periods of the experiment in which there was a 
disagreement in the proposal stage, with at least one of the proposals being a winner’s curse bid 
(282 observations) or when a group’s final decision was a winner’s curse bid even though none 
of the other proposals were winner’s curse bids (3 observations).24 A total of 1150 units of 
messages fit this criterion. We randomly selected one tenth of the messages to develop a coding 
scheme, which classifies messages into 22 categories. Two coders trained separately, 
                                                 
24 Following the methodology utilized in Zhang (2009), a chat unit is defined as a message that was sent out by a 
subject in a given period during one intervention. Units could be a single word or several sentences entered by the 
subject before he or she hit the “enter” button to submit the message. 
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independently coded the messages according to the coding scheme.25  
 Group discussions were primarily focused on the task, as about 70% of the messages 
were coded as task focused. 26 Of these messages, participants talked mostly about numerical 
proposals (25.4%) or simply expressed agreement to any particular proposal (25.8%). Groups 
also spent a decent amount of time discussing how to find the best bidding strategy (17.5%) and 
how to aggregate conflicting proposals (8.7%).27 Statements of threat of disagreement by 
individual group members were modestly common (6.0%), while an explicit mention of veto 
power was less common (0.4%).28 There was little mention of losses (3.4%), as the frequency of 
a loss during the 20 periods of group interactions during the takeover game was low (1.9%).29 
To see the effects of the various categories of messages, we report regression results in 
Table 5 (specifications b and c). The probit regressions with robust standard errors (clusters on 
groups) include all the observations when there is a disagreement in the proposal stage with at 
least one proposal being a winner’s curse bid (282 observations) and when the final group 
decision was a winner’s curse bid even though none of the proposals are winner’s curse bids (3 
observations). Besides the common independent variables included in all regressions, 
                                                 
25 Using binary coding, a message was coded as a 1 if it was deemed by a coder to represent one or more of the 22 
categories and 0 otherwise. Each message could be coded under as many or as few categories as the coders deemed 
appropriate. Messages were coded under one category the majority of time (93.4%), under two categories 6.1% of 
the time, and rarely coded under three categories (0.5%). Coding instructions are attached in the appendix. 
26 All discussions of coding hereafter are based on the average of the two independent codings, unless otherwise 
stated. Specifically, the value of the coding is treated as 1 if two coders agreed that a message belongs to a given 
category; 0 if the two coders agreed that a message does not belong to a given category; 0.5 if two coders disagreed 
with each other. Table A5 provides a summary of the coded messages during the twenty periods of the takeover 
game. The reliabilities of the coding for each category are also reported. 
27 A typical quote is “I still like the 60. It’s very safe, maximize our potential winnings with little risk.” 
28 A typical quote is “I’m going to bit [bid] 60 regardless of your consensus b/c it’s the best choice, we win [“avoid 
winner’s curse] if we are in disagreement”. 
29 The chat pattern over time suggest that groups spent more time during the first six periods, and the next six 
periods to a lesser extent, trying to figure out how to succeed at the takeover game. In contrast, the frequency of 
occurrence for direct pressure and reinforcement was the highest during the first six periods and the last eight 
periods and dropped slightly during periods seven through twelve. 
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specification (b) examines whether the median proposal or the proposal that yields the highest 
expected profit is more likely to prevail as the final group choice. Specification (c) examines 
whether the winners’ cursed proposal or the optimal proposal is more likely to become the final 
group outcome. Regressors about a proposal being majoritarian or median could not be jointly 
estimated in Table 5 with proposal being winner's curse or optimal because of multicollinearity 
issues. 
There are a number of notable findings regarding specification (b). First, in periods 1-20, 
the proposal that was more likely to become the group bid choice proposal was the median bid, 
especially if in addition it was the majority of the individual group member bid. In periods 1-6, 
as long as the proposal bid was shared by a majority, it was more likely to prevail. In contrast, 
the best proposal among the three individual group member proposals did not have a better 
chance of prevailing. This again provides evidence that truth wins norm does not apply in this 
environment. In addition, the self-reported confidence interval of a proposal did not seem to 
matter.  The proposals of both economic and business majors and engineering majors were less 
likely to prevail. The proposals of subjects who had SAT/ACT scores in the low 25% were less 
likely to prevail in periods 1-6 and more likely to prevail in periods 1-20. Finally, the proposals 
of males initially (i.e., within the first 6 periods) and of more risk averse participants later on 
(i.e., within the last 14 periods) were more likely to prevail.   
 In terms of the chat coding, they are more likely to affect the group outcome in the later 
periods. An individual proposal from the member who talked last in the group was less likely to 
prevail. An individual group member’s proposal was more likely to prevail when a group 
member provided concrete numerical bids as proposal suggestions, when a group member used 
26 
 
reinforcement as a means to justify their proposal, and when a group member pushed for 
consensus. An individual group member’s proposal was less likely to prevail when he or she 
discussed irrelevant issues that were unrelated to the takeover game. When people rotated to 
determine the final group choice, it also reduced the likelihood of a proposal to prevail. Also, 
when a group member explicitly agreed with a proposal suggested by another group member, his 
or her proposal was less likely to prevail. A puzzling negative effect on the likelihood of a 
proposal prevailing is observed when the group member discussed the best strategies for 
determining the group’s final bid choice.  
In specification (c), proposals that are winner’s cursed bids and proposals from risk 
averse subjects in early periods had a negative effect on the likelihood of the prevalence of a 
proposal.  The effects of gender and ability disappeared and the effects of majors and the chat 
coding were similar to what we observed in specification (b).  
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
We study the performance of individuals versus groups in a negotiation task. We report 
that small groups made better choices than individuals in isolation and substantially reduced the 
frequency of winner’s curse bids in a company takeover experiment (Result 1). The winner’s 
curse is a widespread behavioral bias in the field and in the lab where people systematically incur 
losses when trying to acquire a good in mineral right auctions, eBay auctions, baseball’s free 
agency market, IPOs pricing and corporate takeovers. Our aim is not to find the origin of the 
winner’s curse but to study whether deciding in groups reduces its magnitude and how this result 
is achieved.  
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Groups make better decisions due to a combination of learning and the process of 
aggregating individual proposals into a group choice. This study reports four main results. First, 
groups learn faster than individuals. In our experiment, as well as in most of the literature, there 
is no significant learning by individuals who bid in a company takeover game (Result 3). We 
report substantial learning by groups in terms of frequency of optimal bids, dispersed bids, and 
winner’s curse bids (Result 2). This study makes clear that learning does not come from the 
simple exposure to diversity of opinions but from engaging in communication and negotiation in 
search of a consensus. In fact, individual bidding is not significantly different if a subject can 
observe and imitate the bids of two other subjects without the possibility to communicate with 
them or the need to reach consensus on a bid (Result 5). One contribution of this study is the 
clarification of what generates learning. 
  Second, individual opinions are aggregated within the group largely by taking the median 
opinion. When in disagreement, 75% of groups’ choices coincide with the opinion of the median 
member (Result 6). In judgmental tasks the social-decision scheme theory of psychology predicts 
that the group will generally perform at the level of  its median member (Davis, 1992). In 
contrast, in intellective tasks like a company takeover, the dominant decision scheme is “truth 
wins,” where groups are expected to perform at the level of the best individual in the group 
(Lorge and Solomon, 1955). We report that – when controlling for risk attitude, some 
demographic characteristics, and the content of the messages exchanged – the best proposal in a 
group is less likely to emerge than other proposals. Other papers compare group choices with 
simulations on individual choices (Cooper and Kagel, 2005, 2009). Instead, this study provides 
direct evidence by comparing each group choice with the individual proposals of all group 
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members. If two people do not get the correct solution, bringing a smart guy into the group will 
not be enough, on average, to overturn the group decisions. 
 Third, there was some herd behavior. We provide indirect support on this point. When 
there was an initial disagreement, the median was more likely to prevail in two-against-one 
situations than with three distinct opinions (80% vs. 72.6%). While there was a group dynamic to 
converge to a middle ground as a compromise, this evidence suggests that there also existed 
another dynamic of herd behavior at play. Such behavior may take the explicit form of pressure 
from the majority or could be implicit, a self-retreat to conform to the majority. By definition 
you need groups of three or larger to study this aspect. Some chat messages refer to statements or 
threats to disagree, but not many (6.4%, Table A5). A way to detect the role of minority opinion 
is to look at the use of veto power. The veto power could have been usefully employed by a 
subject every time others in the group wanted to place a winner’s curse bid. For risk neutral and 
risk averse participants, a sure gain of zero is preferred to an expected loss. Subjects exerted veto 
power less often than optimal (Table 4). An optimal use of veto power in groups would have 
further reduced the frequency of winner’s curse bids from 9.7% to 1.5%.   
  Fourth, we can rule out that the superiority of groups over individuals in the company 
takeover game is due to shifts in risk attitudes generated by group processes. Very few 
experiments on group decision making controlled for this possible confounding factor. 30 
In earlier experiments with auctions, groups did not seem to help much in overcoming the 
winner’s curse or raising profits (Cox and Hayne, 2006, Sutter et al., 2009). Our findings do not 
                                                 
30 An exception is Sheremeta and Zhang (2010). Following a similar group risk preference elicitation methods, they 
find groups are more risk averse than individuals yet risk-aversion does not have a significant effect on groups’ 
bidding behavior in contests. 
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contradict these results and may actually shed light on them. The task in the present study is 
easier than the task in previous studies. In Cox and Hayne (2006) the experimental task was 
difficult: “both individuals and groups are very subject to the winner’s curse when they are 
inexperienced” (p.217). A similar issue applies to Sutter et al. (2009). If groups follow the 
median opinion of their members, in the above experiments one would expect groups to perform 
similarly or worse than individuals because a large majority of individual subjects failed to place 
near-optimal bids. 31 
This out-of-sample prediction of underperformance of groups in comparison to 
individuals spurred the collection of new data from additional sessions, which we ran with a 
more difficult version of the company takeover game, where companies could have 100 different 
values instead of just 5. The data provides support for this prediction. With the more difficult 
task, in the group treatment the frequency of optimal bids is decreasing (22.2% in part 3 vs 
13,0% in part 4, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, N=30, p=0.03). Consider that in the individual 
treatment this fraction is stable or even increasing over time (15.6% in part 3 vs. 22.7% in part 4, 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, N=15, p=0.11). Hence, groups do worse than individuals. Instead, 
the frequency of winner’s curse bids has a similar trend in the two treatments (64.4% vs. 60.5% 
and70.0% vs. 65.7%, respectively).32  
                                                 
31 More generally, results from previous experiments may be different from ours because they implement auctions 
not company takeover games. Different outcomes in terms of individual-group comparisons may originate from 
issues of information aggregation and competition with other potential buyers that are ruled out by design under 
company takeover games with robot sellers.  
32 We ran 1 additional session in the individual treatment and 2 session in the group treatment. Possible company 
values are 21, 22, …, 120. The RNNE bid is 42 and the naïve bid is 63.75. Any bid above 63 generates an expected 
loss. There are significantly more optimal bids in the individual treatment relative to group treatment in part 4 
(Mann-Whitney tests on part 4: n=15, m=10, p=0.058; Robust Rank Order tests, one-tailed p=0.03), where a bid is 
loosely classified as optimal when in the range [31, 53].  Detailed summary statistics can be found in Table A6. For 
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This suggests that groups perform well when a majority of individuals are able to 
overcome the winner’s curse. Further research is needed to understand under what conditions a 
minority can convince the group about the correct solution. While this did not happen in our 
experiment, it did in Maciejovsky and Budescu (2007) where initially 9% of individuals 
correctly solved the Wason task and then about 50% did when groups of four people met for 30 
minutes face to face.   
To conclude, groups may beat a truth-wins benchmark when subjects learn relatively 
faster in groups than when deciding in isolation. With repeated interaction, we report that there 
are two opposite forces at work: a median aggregation rule that may hinder groups from reaching 
a truth-wins benchmark and a fast learning that may more than compensate for it.  
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a thorough test of the majority boost conjecture one would need more observations. Yet, the data are in line with the 
results of previous studies on group bidding in auctions. 
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 When Do Groups Perform Better than Individuals? 
A Company Takeover Experiment 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Buyer’s profits for selected bids 
 
  
Actual profits  
depending on the company value s 
Expected 
Bid, b s = 38 s = 60 s = 90 s = 130 s = 240 profits 
       
38 (loss free) 19 0 0 0 0 3.8 
60 (optimal) -3 30 0 0 0 5.4 
90(naïve) -33 0 45 0 0 2.4 
130 -73 -40 5 65 0 -8.6 
240 -183 -150 -105 -45 120 -72.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the company takeover bids 
  Treatment 
 Individual Group Signal 
  part 3 
(a) 
part 4 
(b) 
part 3 
(c) 
part 4  
bids (d) 
part 4  
proposals (e) 
part 3 
(f) 
part 4 
(g) 
Bid distribution            (percentages)        
38 (loss free) and 39  3.3 10 8.6 8.0 9.0 4.4 7.3 
60 (optimal) and 61 35.6 37.5 30.6 50.5 48.5 17.8 29.7 
90 (naïve) and 91  38.9 31.7 36.7 31.5 30.2 45 40.8 
130 and 131 11.1 14 11.7 7.2 6.8 21.1 16.5 
240 and 241 1.7 2 1.4 2.5 3.1 1.1 1 
All others (dispersed bids) 9.4 4.8 11.1 0.2 2.5 10.6 4.7 
Other measures of performance        
Winner's curse (percentage of bids with negative expected profits) 20 18.3 18.3 9.75 10.5 31.1 18.3 
Actual profits per period (tokens) -1.65 0.4 1.21 2.13 2.13 1.41 2.1 
Simulated profits per period with optimal bids (tokens) 4.8 6.93 5.73 5.93 5.93 4.8 6.93 
Fraction of obs. with low cash balances (limited liability) 0% 2% 0.8% 3.2% -- 0% 0% 
Number of obs., Number of subjects 180, 30 600, 30 360, 60 400,60 1200,60 180, 30 600, 30 
 
Notes to Table 2: Distribution of bid signals for (g) is the same as for (b) 
 Table 3: Who placed optimal bids and winners’ curse bids 
 
All treatments 
(part 3 – Individual 
bids) 
Individual treatment 
(part 4) 
Group treatment 
Individual proposals 
(part 4) 
Signal treatment 
(part 4) 
Dependent variable 
Optimal 
bid 
(a) 
Winner’s 
curse bid 
(b) 
Optimal 
bid 
(c) 
Winner’s 
curse bid 
(d) 
Optimal 
proposal 
(e) 
Winner’s 
curse 
proposal 
(f) 
Optimal 
bid 
(g) 
Winner’s 
curse bid 
(h) 
Risk averse (switch point>13) 0.07 -0.04 (^) (^) -0.06 -0.06* (~) (~) 
 (0.09) (0.07)   (0.14) (0.03)   
Risk seeking (switch point<8) -0.13 -0.08 (^) (^) (~) (~) -0.15 0.30 
 (0.08) (0.08)     (0.11) (0.26) 
High confidence in bid or proposal (-) (-) 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.08*** -0.13** 0.24* 
   (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.13) 
Demographics         
Economics and Business Major 0.10 -0.06 0.31*** -0.08 0.14 0.06 -0.24 0.10 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (0.09) (0.16) (0.15) 
Science and Engineering Major 0.20*** -0.11 0.40*** -0.10 0.13 0.02 -0.44*** 0.16 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11) (0.19) 
Bottom 25percentile SAT/ACT -0.10* 0.24*** 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.13* -0.09* 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.12) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) 
Male 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.14*** 0.02 0.05 -0.11 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) 
Missing demographic data -0.02 0.06 -0.25*** 0.22** -0.14 0.09 -0.18* 0.06 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) 
1/period -0.07 -0.08 1.20 -0.12 -1.69** -0.06 -1.49* 0.98 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.92) (0.65) (0.71) (0.29) (0.89) (0.63) 
At least one signal from two other subjects is optimal bid       0.08  
       (0.06)  
Both signals from two other subjects are optimal bids       0.04  
       (0.10)  
At least one signal from two other subjects is winner’s 
curse bid        0.01 
        (0.04) 
Both signals from two other subjects are winner’s curse 
bids        -0.09** 
        (0.04) 
Number of observations, Number of subjects 717, 120 717, 120 589, 30 589, 30 1166, 60 1166, 60 600, 30 600, 30 
Pseudo R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.090 0.071 0.058 0.086 0.233 0.249 
Log likelihood -387.8 -355.3 -354.1 -259.3 -760.5 -353.3 -279.9 -215.9 
 Notes to Table 3: Marginal effects from probit regression with robust errors on individuals. Observations with low cash balance were excluded from the regression (limited 
liability issue). Four dummies for the value taken by the company in the previous period were in the regression but not reported in the table, value_was60, value_was90, 
value_was130, value_was240 (company value was 60, 90, 130 or 240 in the last period); for period one they were set to zero value. (-) Across all treatments subjects were 
required to indicate the level of confidence on the bid in part 4 but not in part 3. (^) everyone in this treatment is risk neutral or moderately risk averse. (~) risk preference 
regressors are dropped because of collinearity Session dummies were included in the regression but not reported in the table. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Table 4: Aggregation of individual proposals into a group choice 
Group treatment, Part 4 
 
Group classification based on individual 
proposals: 
No. of 
proposals 
Actual no. of 
winner’s 
cursed bids 
Expected no. of 
winner’s cursed bids 
if subjects exercise 
veto power 
No winner's curse proposals 912 3 0 
There is only one winner’s curse proposal  216 54 0 
There are two winner’s curse proposals  54 42 0 
All winner's curse proposals 18 18 18 
Total 1,200 117 18 
Frequency of winner’s curse  
(out of 1200) 
10.6% 9.7% 1.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Solving disagreement among individual proposals 
Group treatment, Part 4 
 
Dependent variable: 
1=individual proposal became group 
choice, 
0= otherwise 
All obs. 
Periods 
1-6 
(a) 
All obs. 
Periods 
7-20 
(a) 
Periods 
1-6 
(b) 
Periods 
7-20 
(b) 
Periods 
1-6 
(c) 
Periods 
7-20 
(c) 
       
Proposal is median and majority 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.95*** 0.73***   
 (0.120) (0.069) (0.02) (0.13)   
Proposal is median but not majority 0.05 0.40*** 0.15 0.39**   
 (0.123) (0.081) (0.16) (0.16)   
Among group proposals, it yields 0.14 -0.11 -0.24* -0.34*   
     the highest expected profit (0.123) (0.086) (0.13) (0.19)   
Proposal is winner's curse     -0.45*** -0.01 
     (0.13) (0.15) 
Proposal is optimal: 60 or 61     -0.19 -0.10 
     (0.13) (0.13) 
Low cash endowment, 0.14 0.05 (^) -0.19 (^) -0.11 
   below limited liability threshold (0.133) (0.079)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Subject is risk averse  0.03 0.09 -0.20 0.35** -0.42*** 0.05 
   (switch point>13) (0.118) (0.087) (0.21) (0.15) (0.13) (0.20) 
Subject is risk seeking  -0.31*** -0.06 -0.00 -0.17 0.12 -0.06 
   (switch point<8) (0.075) (0.110) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) 
High confidence proposal -0.13 0.06 -0.36 0.02 -0.00 0.07 
 (0.136) (0.078) (0.24) (0.13) (0.21) (0.14) 
                Demographics       
Economics and Business major 0.01 0.03 -0.17 -0.46*** -0.53*** -0.54*** 
 (0.080) (0.186) (0.31) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) 
Science and Engineering major 0.05 0.09 -0.37** -0.33** -0.52*** -0.37*** 
 (0.080) (0.159) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.10) 
Bottom 25% SAT/ACT score  -0.19** 0.07 -0.40* 0.20** -0.06 0.11 
 (0.083) (0.076) (0.21) (0.09) (0.23) (0.12) 
Male 0.14* -0.01 0.48*** -0.13 0.07 -0.16 
 (0.087) (0.074) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) 
Missing demographic data 0.02 0.13 0.22* 0.13 0.07 -0.16 
 (0.075) (0.119) (0.13) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) 
 
 
To be continued on the next page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5: Solving disagreement among individual proposals 
Group treatment, Part 4-continued 
 
Dependent variable: 
1=individual proposal became group 
choice, 
0= otherwise 
All obs. 
Periods 
1-6 
(a) 
All obs. 
Periods 
7-20 
(a) 
Periods 
1-6 
(b) 
Periods 
7-20 
(b) 
Periods 
1-6 
(c) 
Periods 
7-20 
(c) 
          Chat message coding       
I talked first (1 or 0)   -0.07 0.22 0.11 0.08 
   (0.27) (0.19) (0.19) (0.16) 
I talked last (1 or 0)   0.03 -0.23** -0.03 -0.16** 
   (0.21) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) 
Numerical   -0.00 0.13*** -0.00 0.10*** 
   (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Think   -0.07 -0.24** -0.04 -0.25*** 
   (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) 
Pressure   0.01 0.08* -0.05 0.08 
   (0.19) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) 
Reinforcement   -0.11 0.47*** 0.10 0.50*** 
   (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Loss   -0.18 0.11 0.12 0.13 
   (0.17) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) 
Aggregate   0.15 (-) -0.16* (-) 
   (0.11)  (0.09)  
Rotate   0.49 -0.66*** 0.23 -0.50** 
   (0.41) (0.22) (0.34) (0.24) 
Agreement   -0.22** -0.01 -0.25*** -0.02 
   (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) 
Irrelevant   -0.07* -0.05* -0.04 -0.02 
   (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Number of obs., Number of subjects 240, 60 405, 60 101, 39 176, 36 101, 39 176, 36 
Pseudo R-squared 0.370 0.325 0.564 0.405 0.246 0.187 
Log likelihood -104.1 -188.6 -30.48 -72.53 -52.79 -99.18 
 
Notes to Table 5: Probit regression with robust standard errors (clusters on groups). Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Specifications (a) include all individual proposals unless all identical within the group in a given period (645 obs.) Specifications (b) and 
(c) include all the observations when there is a disagreement in the proposal stage with at least one proposal is a winners’ cursed bid (282 
obs.) and when the final group decision is winner’s cursed bid even though none of the proposals are winner’s cursed bids (3 obs.). (^) for 
periods 1-6, the limited liability regressor is a structural zero: it perfectly predicts failure (proposal does not prevail in group choice), one 
observation is dropped from the regression; (-) for period 7-20, chat message coding “aggregate” regressor perfectly predicts failure, 7 
observation are dropped from the regression. 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Fraction of optimal bids over time 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Fraction of winner’s curse bids over time 
 
  
 
Figure 3: Fraction of dispersed bids over time 
 
 
